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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Securities and Exchange CommissionHearings on Voluntary Plans for Simplification under the Holding
Company Act-The Securities and Exchange Commission instituted
proceedings against petitioners pursuant to § ii (b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,' the hearing thereunder being limited to the
issue of dissolution. Late in the proceedings, petitioners, pursuant to § II
(e) of the Act,2 submitted voluntary plans which purported to achieve the
requirements of § ii (b) (2) without dissolution of petitioners. After examining the plans thoroughly, the Commission denied a full hearing' on
them prior to the entry of its order, on the ground that the plans failed to
hold out any real promise of effectuating the provisions of the Act and
that a full hearing on them would delay unnecessarily the consummation
of the pending proceedings. The Commission then entered its § ii (b) (2)
order, directing dissolution of petitioners. 4 On petition for review, it was
contended, inter alia, that the Commission erred in not granting a full
hearing on the plans prior to entering its order.5 Held, affirmed. The
Commission may, in its discretion, defer full hearings on § ii (e) plans
until after the entry of § ii (b) (2) orders. 6 The exercise of the Commission's discretion is guided by the statutory requirement of prompt action, and, to this end, voluntary plans are not necessarily to be given the
effect of staying proceedings under § iI (b) (2). American Power &
Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 67 Sup. Ct. 133 (1946).
The instant case raises the question of the interrelationship of the
hearing requirements of §§ ii (b) (2) and ii (e). The Commission has
the affirmative duty of requiring compliance with § ii (b) (2) as soon as
1. 49 STAT. 803, 821 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 k (b) (2) (1940). This section directs the Commission, as soon as practicable after January I, 1938, "To require by
order, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that each registered holding company,
, shall take such steps as the Commission shall find necessary to ensure that
the corporate structure or continued existence of any company . . . does not unduly
or unnecessarily complicate the structure, or unfairly or inequitably distribute voting
power among security holders, of such holding company system."
2. 49 STAT. 803, 822 (935),

15 U. S. C. § 79k (e)

(ig4o).

This section provides

that "In accordance with such rules and regulations or order as the Commission may
deem necessary or appropriate . . ., any registered holding company . . . may, at
any time after January I, 1936, submit a plan to the Commission . . . for the pur-

pose of enabling such company . . . to comply with the provisions of subsection
(b). If, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission shall find such plan,
. . ., necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b), and fair and equitable
to the persons affected by such plan, the Commission shall make an order approving
such plan; ..

."

3. The term "full hearing" is used throughout to denote a hearing which is concerned both with the efficacy of the ultimate objective of a plan and with the details of
attaining such objective.
4. II S. E. C. 1146 (1942).
5. The Commission's order was affirmed below, where petitioners raised the same
objection., 141 F. (2d) 6o6 (C. C. A. ist, 1944).
6. Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring, held that it was incumbent upon the Commission to provide by rules and regulations for a hearing on the plans prior to the
entry of the order, that the Commission failed so to provide, but that petitioners must
be deemed to have waived their rights to such hearings by submitting their Vlans unseasonably. Instant case at 15o.
(55')
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practicable, by compulsion if necessary. 7 On the other hand, § ii (e)* was
designed topermit companies to work out voluntary plans for compliance
which would make unnecessary the entry of involuntary orders, 8 but Congress did not intend that voluntary plans should relieve the9 pressure on
holding company management to achieve prompt compliance. Therefore,
with respect to the requirement of promptness, the denial of full hearings
on voluntary plans seems proper where, as in the instant case, such plans
10
However, sections ii (b) (2) and ii (e) are not
are primarily dilatory.
mutually exclusive methods of achieving compliance with the Act."- Thus,
where the ultimate objectives of a § ii (b) (2) order and a § ii (e) plan
2
But where, as in
are the same, the plan simply implements the order.'

the instant case, the plan challenges the ultimate objective contemplated by
the order, it becomes necessary to resolve the conflict prior to the entry
In this
of the order, if regard is to be had for the piirpose: of § ii (e).11
situation, a determination of what is necessary to effectuate the statutory
provisions is common to hearings under both sections of the Act. It is
therefore difficult to see how the § ii (e) hearing requirement is violated
(2) proceeding, the Commission gives thor(b)
where, during a § ii

ough consideration to a voluntary plan on the issue of its efficacy.

If it

be found that the plan will not achieve compliance, then the details thereof
are rendered irrelevant and hearings on such details made unnecessary.
14
In effect, this
To this extent; the denial of full hearings seems proper.
5
The
was the procedure employed by the Commission in the instant case.'
foregoing considerations make obscure the basis for the concurring opinion's position that the Commission treated § ii (e) as an alternative method
for achieving compliance with the Act, which it was free to follow or disFor the same reasons, it is not clear why the
regard at its pleasure.'"
majority opinion suggests that full hearings on voluntary plans would be
required prior to the entry of a § I i (b) (2) order, where such plans are
7. A § ii (b) (2) order makes operative the § ii (c) time limitation within which
compliance with the order must be achieved, and it empowers the Commission to apply
to the courts to enforce compliance pursuant to § ii (d). 49 STAT. 803, 821, 15 U. S.
C. §§79 k (c), (d).
8. See SEN. REP. No. 621, 74 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 33.
9. Id. at 58-6o.
io. It was well established that the plans in the instant case were submitted for
the strategic purpose of delaying the order. ii S. E. C. 1146, 1216 (1945). See SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1942)

72-73.

ii. See Northern States Power Company, S. E. C. (1947). HOLDING COMPANY
ACT Release No. 7148.
12. In such a case, a full hearing on the details of the plan is assured either before
or after the entry of the order. See instant case at 149; Commonwealth and Southern
Corporation v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 134 F. (2d) 747, 754 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1942) ; Securities and Exchange Commission brief, instant case, pp. 11o-114, 120123.

13. Cf. Ashbacker Radio Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission, 326
U. S. 327, 329-330 (1945).
14. It should be noted that the hearing required under § ii (e) is concerned with
whether the plan is (a) necessary to effectuate the provisions of the statute and (b)
fair and equitable to those affected. See note 2 supra. The former issue goes to the
ultimate objective to be attained and may be determined quite apart from the latter
issue, which involves complex details. See Commonwealth and Southern Corporation
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 134 F. (2d) 747, 754 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942).
I5. See instant case at 149; ii S. E. C. 1146, 1216-1223 (1942).
16. See instant case at 151.
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prima facie meritorious. 17 Rather, it would seem that the hearing requirements of both sections are integrated and satisfied by the Commission's
procedure in the instant case.'

Bankruptcy-Interest on Defaulted Bond Interest Does Not Accrue in Bankruptcy-Bonds secured by a first mortgage, containing a
covenant that interest be paid on overdue principal or overdue installments
of interest, were issued by Inland Gas Corporation in 1928.1 The indenture
was executed in New York, by a Delaware corporation, whose principal
place of business and assets were in Kentucky. As a result of action
instituted by another utility for the purpose of stifling competition an
equity receiver was appointed for Inland Gas in 1930,2 the officers enjoined from paying its debts, and the equity court did not direct the payment of the bond coupons due February I, 1931. Thereupon, the indenture trustee filed a bill of foreclosure. Later a reorganization action was
duly transformed into a Chapter X proceedings. The present controversy
is whether the first mortgage bondholder's claim in the distribution properly includes the covenanted amount of the interest on overdue interest,
the mortgaged assets being of sufficient value to cover the claim.3 The
District Court upheld the claim of the bondholders. The Circuit Court
reversed on a conflict of laws point.4 On certiorari,held, in determining
claims allowable and the distribution of assets, a bankruptcy court is not
bound by state law but must administer bankruptcy laws in accordance
with equitable principles. A legal suspension of the obligation to pay
interest is adequate reason why no added compensation or penalty is to be
enforced for failure to pay interest. To do otherwise would enrich the
first mortgage bondholders and cause subordi:ate creditors to suffer a
17. Id. at 149. It might be desirable, for instance, to set in motion the affirmative
consequences of a § ii (b) (2) order prior to the completion of full hearings on voluntary plans. See note 7 supra. See also Northern States Power Company, S. E. C.
(1947), HOLDING Co0:PANY AcT Release No. 7148.
I8. Cf. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 3o9
U: S. 134 (1940).
I. Covenants of this nature appear to be relatively common in mortgage trust indentures. Out of 57 indentures selected at random from the files of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's list of indentures qualified under the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, 53 STAT. 1149, I5 U. S. C. §77aaa (940), 49 contained covenants for interest on overdue installments of interest. Brief for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, p. 7 n., Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45, Supreme Court, October Term, 1946.
2. Columbia Gas and Electric Corporation v. United States, I51 F. (2d) 461 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1945), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 48 (1946). The court found that Columbia
Gas had purchased approximately 36% of the bonds and 76% of the oustanding stock
in order to be in a position to take advantage of the insecure financial position of Inland Gas Corporation, which was threatening Columbia with serious competition. The
holders of 25% of the bonds outstanding might request the trustee of the Inland Trust
Indenture to institute foreclosure proceedings upon default. As a result of the finding
that receivership was instituted by Columbia Gas as a device to stifle competition, the
court in this case ordered Columbia's claims on bonds and stocks to be subordinated to
the claims of other creditors of every class.
3. Petition for Rehearing Nos. 42, 43, Sup. Ct, October Term, 1946, cites figures
upon which this estimate was made. It was contingent upon the rejection of the appeal
in Columbia Gas and Electric Corp. v. United States, i5i F. (2d) 461 (C. C. A. 6th,
1945) cited mspra note 2. Certiorariwas denied in that case, 67 Sup. Ct. 48 (1946).
4. Green v. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee, 151 F. (2d) 47o (C. C.
A. 6th, 1945). The District Court did not write an opinion.
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corresponding loss. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green,
67 Sup. Ct. 237 (I946). 5
This case is somewhat uncommon, not alone because the majority of
the Court relied upon cases which offer a very uncertain foundation for
its theory,6 but also because the point upon which it was decided was
not argued by counsel for the bondholders or the Securities and Exchange
Commission.7 Relying first upon cases involving interest in tax disputes,, a question hardly comparable to the interest contract of a trust
indenture, the majority purported to find therein a principle indicating
when and under what circumstances federal law will allow interest. Other
the security
cases were cited where the creditor was deneid interest when
9
amounted to less than the principal and interest claimed, though in one
of these the creditor had delayed the sale of the assets in the hope of
obtaining a larger return thereby.' 0 This rule of denying interest where
the secured assets will not cover principal and interest seems well established, but the same rule does not apply where the security is sufficient to
pay both; " the situation in the present case. The Court cites the Ticonic
National Bank case 12 as a holding that the right of bondholders to share
in unmortgaged assets is limited to their sharing ratably with unsecured
creditors; but since mortgaged assets are involved in the present dispute,
that portion of the Ticonic National Bank opinion which seems directly
applicable is to the effect that even a non-interest bearing lien entitles
its holder to interest for any period subsequent to bankruptcy when the
assets on which he has a lien are sufficient to cover principal and interest. 13
Are we now to understand that the Bankruptcy Act sanctions disturbing
this inequality (at least as to interest on overdue interest covenants) which
has been bargained for by the debtor and creditor and is a matter of
record,'14 and if so is this another straw in the wind moving toward modification of the priority rule? 15 Turning, to the economic phase of the case,
5. Cert. denied, 15 U. S. L. WEEK 3266.
6. Justice Frankfurter and two other members of the court joined in a concurring
opinion based on the conflict of laws point of the appeal.
7. Examination of the briefs discloses no such contention, and letter from counsel
stated that the point was not argued orally. The S. E. C. joined with the Vanston
Bondholders Committee in the appeal under Section 2o8, Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 894
(938), I U. S. C. § 608 (194o).
8. Board of Commissioners of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U. S. 343
(939) ; Royal Indemnity Company v. United States, 313 U. S. 289 (941).
9. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1893).
io. Sexton v. Dreyfuss, 219 U. S. 339 (1911).
ii. Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223 (19o9) and Group of Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318 U. S. 523 (943) held that under Section 77B"
of the Bankruptcy Act interest on secured claims accruing to the date of the plan had
the same priority as principal.
12. Ticonic National Bank v. Sprague, 303 U. S. 406 (1938).
13. In reaching this conclusion the Court had said: "But to the extent that a debt
is secured and another is not there is manifestly an inequality of rights between secured
and unsecured creditors, which can not be affected by the principle of equality of distribution . . . and interest accruing after insolvency may not be withheld on account
of that principle." Id. at 412. Accord: Chemical National Bank v. Armstrong, 59 Fed.
372 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893).

14. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Company, 308 U. S. io6 (1939). In
this case, although more than 8o% of the bondholders agreed to the plan of reorganization, the court condemned it as not fair and equitable because the bondholders
had not been given an absolute priority in the assets.
The
15. Otis v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 323 U. S. 624 (945).
court found a plan fair and equitable which allowed the common stockholders to participate in the distribution of the assets before preferred stockholders received the value
of their full liquidation preference. This on the grounds that Congress did not intend
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the court thought that allowing interest on the coupons dating back to
1931 would "enrich" the holders and would not be justified on equitable
principles.' 6 However, although the federal government has been committed to a low interest rate policy for many years, the prevailing concept
of interest in capitalistic society, reached by different theoretical approaches,
is still a payment for something productive, something used for profit and
advantage.17 In this case the interest funds withheld from bondholders
were available, for at least a part of the period, to the bankrupt estate
the affairs
and used for the benefit of that estate. Since it appears that
5
of the company improved during the years of bankruptcy," the benefit
seems to have accrued to the estate. Is it equitable thus to allow the
debtor estate to profit by this delay beyond the day of settlement? 19 Had
the bondholders received their interest when due, reinvestment or the
pleasure of consumption would have brought them the equivalent of what
they now claim. While bondholders have traditionally been linked with
wealth, the serious financial repercussions of this type of situation to institutional investors and persons of limited means can not be doubted. Furthermore, here the court is considering the equities between creditors, and
creditors and debtor, not the question of lower fuel rates which might be
brought about by reduced interest costs, where public policy might weigh
heavily in determining equities. If this decision is to stand, with interest
on interest covenants barred in bankruptcy, bondholders will have an
inducement to seek recovery through other avenues of protection-demand
for sale, operation of the properties, and the like. Will this be to the
benefit of the debtor or subsequent creditor?
Bankruptcy-Preference--Perfection of Assignment of Accounts
Receivable under Restatement Rule-A New Jersey retailer assigned
forty-four accounts receivable as security for advances conctrrently made.
The assignee did not notify the debtors of the assignments until five days
before the assignor was thrown into bankruptcy. The court assumed that
New Jersey law governing priority of successive assignments provided that
a first assignee did not have to notify the debtor to be protected; but if a
subsequent bona fide assignee collected from the debtor, he could retain
the proceeds.' Held, the potential interest of a possible second assignee
that the exercise of its power over holding company systems should mature rights
created without regard to the possibility of the exercise of that power and which otherwise would mature only by the voluntary act of stockholders or involuntarily by their
creditors.
r6. United States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304 (1924). The court distinguished between interest as a form of compensation, and a penalty as a form of punishment.
17. While many theories purport to explain interest, a modern concept which has
received much approval is that of J. M. Keynes, to the effect that interest is a reward
paid to induce savers to give up their liquidity preference for a specified period.
K-EYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EmPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936) p. 167.
is. Petition for Rehearing, cited supra note 3.
19. Sexton v. Dreyfuss, 219 U. S. 339, 346, cited supra note io. Interest and dividends accumulating on securities. on which creditors had a lien were ordered paid to
the creditors on the ground that it was not equitable thus to permit the debtor or subsequent creditors to profit by delay in settling the estate.
1. The court was doubtful whether New Jersey followed the Restatement rule
or the New York rule on assignments of accounts receivable. It assumed the position
most favorable to the trustee in bankruptcy and decided the case on the basis of the
Restatement rule. Compare Moorestown Trust Co. v. Buzby, iog N. J. Eq. 409, 157
Atl. 663 (932) with Executors of Luse v. Parke, 17 N. J. Eq. 4,5 (1864) and Emley
v. Perrine, 58 N. J. L. 472, 33 Atl. 951 (1896).
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was
was not such as would enable the trustee to claim that the assignment
2
Rosen,
re
In
Act.
Bankruptcy
the
of
(a)
6o
§
under
preference
voidable
a
157 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1946).
The effect of this case, if its rule stands, will be to limit attacks on
accounts receivable financing to those cases in which the assignee's interest
3
Seccan be defeated only by subsequent events within his own control.
antecedent
tion 6o (a) defines a preference as a transfer made-for an
debt within four months prior to bankruptcy and provides that a transfer
shall be deemed to have been made when no bona fide purchaser could
thereafter acquire any rights in the property transferred superior to those
of the transferee. The Supreme Court in the5 Klauder case 4 held that
in states adhering to the rule of Dearle v. Hall, i. e. as between successive
assignees the first to notify the debtor prevails, assignments were not perfected until the assignee had given notice. Since under the New York
6
rule the first assignee is protected whether he gives notice or not, the
in
obtain
to
thought
rule
The
made.
when
assignment would be perfected
7
New Jersey, which is that adopted by the Restatement, is really a modification of the New York rule, extending the protection everywhere given
to. a bona fide paying debtor to a second assignee collecting in good faith.
This court concluded that the rights accorded to a subsequent assignee
fide purchaser, but
in New Jersey are not due to his status as a bona
8
But in the Klauder
spring from his activities following the assignment.
case the effect of a subsequent assignee's action, i. e. notification, was the
basis for deciding that the assignment was not perfected. However, there
is a valid distinction in the type of action required under the state law
in each case-in the Klauder case, notification could be controlled by the
first assignee; in the instant case collection is within control of the paying
debtor.9 The decision in the instant case can also be supported on the
ground that a second assignee in New Jersey acquires no superior right
in the "property transferred"--as required by § 6o (a)-but that his right
in the proceeds of such property is protected after that property has ceased
0
Moreover, under the New
to exist by reason of his collection of the debt.'
11 U. S. C. §96 (194o).
3. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy (1946) 6o HAxv L. Rxv. 233,
249-250.
4. Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434 (1943),
(1943) 91 U. OF PA. L. REV. 666.
5. 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (1828). Pennsylvania originally was in accord.
Phillips' Estate (No. 3), 205 Pa. 515, 55 Atl. 213 (i9o3). But the rule has subsequently been changed. Act of July 31, 1941, P. L. 6o6, § i, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
Supp. 1945) tit. 69, § 561.
6. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 266 App. Div. 579, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 264 (1st
Dep't 1944), aff'd. on different grounds, 292 N. Y. 347, 55 N. E. (2d) 192 (1944) and
323 U. S. 365 (945) ; State Factors Corp. v. Sales Factors Corp., 257 App. Div. OI,
12 N. Y. S. (2d) 12 (ist Dep't 1939).
7. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 173. In addition to protecting a second
assignee who has collected from the debtor, the Restatement Rule also protects him
when he (i) obtains a judgment against the debtor; (2) secures a novation; (3) obtains an instrument which embodies the debt. Accord, Rabinowitz v. People's National
Bank 235 Mass. 102, 126 N. E. 289 (1920) (but Massachusetts has since adopted the
New York rule, MAss. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, ch. Io7A, § i (Recomp. Vol., 1947)); see
also Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 199, n. 7.
8. Instant case at lOO1.
9. McLaughlin, supra note 3.
1o. See Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable (945) 33 CAL. L. REv. 40,
85. Contra: In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E. D. Mo., 1943).
2. 52 STAT. 840 (1938),
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Jersey or Restatement rule, it is doubtful if notice by a first assignee to
the debtor, before a second assignee collects in good faith, would be sufficient to defeat the protection given the bona fide second assignee; 11 this
being the case the assignment could never be perfected as long as the debt
remained uncollected, and the assignee seeking to enforce his lien in bankruptcy would always fail.' 2 The decision reached by this court circumvents
this possibility by giving to the Restatement rule the same consequences in
bankruptcy as the New York rule and is in line with the policy of recent
state legislation validating the position of the first assignee in non-notification financing of accounts receivable.: 3

Corporations-Powers and Liabilities-Criminal Responsibility
for Act of Agent-Defendant corporation, whose salesman induced a
customer to execute a false certification of necessity in violation of a War
Production Board Order,' was indicted for the violation. On appeal from
conviction in the trial court held, reversed, because it was shown that the
agent's act was unknown to anyone else in the corporation and was committed in direct disobedience to instructions. Holland Furnace Co. v.
United States, 158 F. (2d) 2 (C. C. A. 6th, 1946).
Although an early English court held that corporations are not indictable 2 the criminal laws have been progressively extended so that corporations have been convicted for a wide variety of crimes, including those
which require personal intent as an essential ingredient." It is not, however, clearly settled whether a corporation may be indicted for a crime
committed by its agent within the scope of his authority but without the
ii. No cases were discovered involving this exact point; this may be due to the
fact that such situation would require the concurring dishonesty of both the assignor
and debtor-a rare possibility. However, § 173 of the Restatement is very explicit in
protecting the first assignee in all except the specifically excepted situations mentioned
in note 7 supra. See Am. LAW INST., COMMENTARIES ON RESTATEMENT (Contracts
No. I5-R., 1926) 33, 34.
12. To allow notice by the first assignee to operate as a perfection of the assign-

ment for bankruptcy purposes where the assignment is made in states having the Restatement rule would be contrary to the holding of the Kfauder case that state law is
controlling for this purpose.
13. See Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Accounts Receivable (1946) 44 Mic. L. Ray. 563.
1. WPB Limitation Order L-79 § 3288.31, IO FED. REG. 8556 (1945) : "No seller

may deliver an item on list A to fill a consumer's unrated order unless he obtains a
certification. . . No one may deliver relying on the certification being true if he
knows or should know that it is false. . . . Any person who wilfully violates any
provision of this order or who, in connection with the order, willfully conceals a material fact or furnishes false information to any department or agency of the United
States is guilty of a crime and upon conviction thereof may be punished by fine or imprisonment, or both."
2. Sutton's Case, 12 Mod. 559 [K. B., I7O1].
3. United States v. New York Herald Co., I59 Fed. 296 (S.D. N. Y., i9o7)
(knowingly depositing obscene matter in the mails) ; Golden Guernsey Farms v. State,
63 N. E. (2d) 699 (Ind., 1945) (selling adulterated food with intent to defraud) ; Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445 (1899) (criminal contempt); State v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 9o N. J. L. 372, X03 At. 685
(1917), aff'd., 94 N. J. L. 171, iii Atl. 257 (1920) (manslaughter) ; People v. Canadian Fur Trapper's Corp., 248 N. Y. 159, I6r N. E. 455 (1928) (larceny). But see
BALLANTINF, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 94; Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation (1924) 18 ILL. L. REV. 305; Canfield, Corporate Responsibility for Crime
(914)
14 COL. L. REV. 469.
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knowledge of the corporation or against its instructions. 4 There are relatively recent cases which, while not square holdings on the issue, indicate
that knowledge by the corporation is necessary to sustain conviction.5 The
court here relies heavily on John, Gund Brewing Co. v. United States 6

in which it was held that the disobedience of the agent was competent
evidence for the corporation's defense, and attempts to distinguish cases
which have reached contrary conclusions. The grounds for distinction,
however, appear to be somewhat doubtful. United States v. Ill. Cent.
R. R. Co.,7 for example, involved the violation of a law which prohibited
the confining of cattle in cars for longer than a specified period. The instant court contended that the negligence of the yardmaster was properly
imputed to the corporation because the law there had imposed a nondelegable duty. It is difficult to see how the duty imposed in the instant
case is any the less non-delegable. C. I. T. v. United States8 is distinguished
in that the offending agent there was a branch manager. But the court
in that decision carefully stated that it considered the position of the agent
in the corporate hierarchy immaterial to the issue of criminal responsibility.
New York Central R. R. Co. v. United States " is distinguished on the
ground that the violated law expressly made the act of the agent that of
the corporation. But the Supreme Court considered such an express provision unnecessary in imputing the crime to the corporation in Dotterweich
v. United States,1 where that point was raised. Further, the court ignores
a recent circuit court decision and several state court decisions all of which
are contra to the instant decision."' Also unnoted are recent English decisions which indicate that lack of knowledge by the corporation is not de2
cisive on the question of liability.'

Apart from the matter of legal precedent, the court's analysis of the
problem is questionable. It is submitted that no general rule should be
developed from the cases involving this problem, but rather that the decision should rest on the reasonable interpretation of the statute violated.
In the instant case the prohibited act, by its very nature, would in many
(perhaps most) instances be done by a corporate agent and to exonerate
4. "Moreover, a corporation may be liable to a penalty for an act of an agent if

done in the course of his employment though contrary to instructions." io FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATINS (perm. ed., 1931) § 4949. "The fact that a
corporation's agent exceeds his authority or acts without the knowledge or sanction
of his principal is a matter of defense." 7 THoMpsoN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed.,
1927) § 5645. "A principal will not ordinarily be held liable for the crimes of his
agent unless he in some way directed or participated in, or approved the act."
MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY (3d ed., 1923) § 562.
5. Old Monastary Co. v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 9o5 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945);
United States v. Wilson, 59 F. (2d) 97 (W. D. Wash., 1932); cf. Mininsohn v. United
States, ioI F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; United States v. Brunett, 53 F. (2d) 219
(W. D. Mo., 1931).
6. 204 Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913).
7. 303 U. S. 239 (1938).
8. 15o F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945).
9. 212 U. S. 481 (19o9).
10. 320

U.

S. 277 (1943).

II. Zito v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) ; State Bank of
Waterloo v. Potosi Tie & Lumber Co., 299 Ill. App. 524, 2o N. E. (2d) 893 (1939) ;
Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 194 Wis. 636, 217 N. W. 412 (1928) ; cf. United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943) ; Ripka v. Philco Corp., 65 F. Supp. 21 (S. D. N.
Y., 1945), aff'd., 154 F. (2d) 5o (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) ; Pratt v. Duck, 191 S. W. (2d)
562 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1945) ; TWA v. Bank of America, i16 P. (2d) 791 (Cal., 1941).
12. Mousell Bros., Ltd. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. [19,7] 2 K. B. 836; cf. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors, Ltd. [1944] K. B.
146; Griffiths v. Studebakers, Ltd. [1924] I K. B. io2.
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the corporation would, therefore, effectively circumvent the purpose of
the law. This test of liability has been adopted in England 13 and was
endorsed in the C. I. T. case. 1 4 Its use in this case would have been
highly desirable.
Criminal Law-Polygamy-Application of Mann Act to Mormons
-Defendants in a prosecution for violation of the White Slave Traffic Act I
are members of a Mormon sect which still practices polygamy. 2 Each defendant had transported at least one plural wife across state lines either for
the purpose of cohabiting with her or for the purpose of aiding another
member of the cult in such a practice. The Act makes an offense the
transportation in interstate commerce of "any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose."
The defendants were convicted. On certiorari, held, (three judges dissenting) 3 such transportation across state lines was for an "immoral purpose" within the meaning of the Act. Although the Act was aimed primarily at the use of interstate commerce for the conduct of the white
slave business, its application is not restricted to commercialized vice, since
debauchery 4 means indulgence motiyated solely by lust. Cleveland v.
United States, 67 Sup. Ct. I3 (1946).
The Mann Act is universally recognized as a foremost example of the
application of the rule of statutory construction which holds that if the
language of a statute is plain, the courts will not consider the intent of
the legislature.5 A recent decision of the Supreme Court had seemingly
13. This test grew out of the Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vicr. c. 63, § 2,
which provides that "In the construction of every enactment relating to an offense
punishable by indictment . . . the word 'person' shall, unless contrary intention appears, include a body corporate." In ascertaining whether or not a "contrary intention"
appears, the English courts have come to inquire what the statute in question was designed to accomplish and whether or not the conviction of the corporation would best
accomplish this purpose. This analysis is well illustrated in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent & Essex Contractors, Ltd. [1944] K. B. 146 and'in Mousell Bros.,
Ltd. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. [1917] 2 K. B. 836. The test was well summed up
in the latter case (at 846) : "When a penalty is imposed for the breach of a duty, it is
reasonable to infer that the penalty is imposed for the default of a person by whom
the duty would ordinarily be performed."
14. The court there decided that the law violated (falsification of credit certificates
turned over to the United States Government) was violated by the person "by whom
the duty would ordinarily be performed" and that if the corporation were not held
liable the purpose of the law . . . deterring the submission of false certificates to
the Government by credit agencies . . . would be rendered futile.

1.36

STAT. 825 (191o) 18 U. S. C. § 398 (1940).
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has forbidden plural marriages
since 189o. See Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621, 95 Pac. 26 (19o8).
3. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the majority opinion. Justices Black, Jackson,
and Murphy dissented, with Justice Murphy writing the dissenting opinion.
4. "'Debauchery,' contemplated within the act, evidently includes corruption of
sexual moral principles. In its common meaning, to 'debauch' is to lead astray morally
into dishonest and vicious practices; to corrupt; to lead into unchastity. 'Debauchery'
is ordinarily thought of as an excessive indulgence of the body; licentiousness; the taking up of vicious habits. As used in the statute, it connotes sexual immorality and that
character of life which will lead eventually to sexual immorality." United States v.
Long, 16 F. Supp. 231, 232 (E. D. Ill., 1936).
5. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917) ; Booth, The White Slave
Traffic Act (1945) CALIF. S. B. J. 102; (1944) 33 GEo. L. J.114, ii8. There seems
little doubt that the sole intent of the legislative framers was to prevent the procuring
and shipping of prostitutes in interstate commerce by professional panderers. H. R.
REP. No. 47, 6Ist Cong., 2d Sess. (igio) IO; Sax. REP. No. 886, 6Ist Cong., 2d Sess.
(1910) ; 45 CONG. REc. 8o5, 821, 1035, 1037 (igio) ; instant case at 2o.
2.
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,indicated that the trend was to limit the application of the Act to commercialized or compulsory prostitution in conformity with the original
Congressional intention 6 and thus overcome the objectionable results of the
literal interpretation.7 ' The instant case, however, would seem to show that
the majority of the Court is not yet willing to overthrow the ruling of the
Caminetti case," which extended the application of the Act beyond the field
of commercialized vice-not, at least, when there is an opportunity to strike
another telling blow at polygamy. It is not surprising that the Court
should hold that polygamous practices are in the same genus as the other
immoral acts covered by the statute 9 in view of the far from sympathetic
manner in which the celebrated "Mormon cases" were treated.' 0 Arguments in defense of polygamy based on religious conviction have been
foreclosed since Reynolds v. United States." The law looks upon the
plural "marriage" as completely inexcusable and the children of such a
union are treated as illegitimates. 12 It must be remembered that religion
is the very bloodstream of our legal system,'3 and common law has always
treated polygamy as an offense against society.' 4 Religious motivation
being immaterial, there seems to be less justification for the defendant in
the instant case than for the individual who transports his single concubine across a state line. Thus, the Court has by its decisiori reaffirmed
the sweeping construction of the Mann Act and placed another obstacle in
the path of the polygamist.

Labor-Refusal to Handle Goods-Conspiracy in Restraint of
Trade-Appellants are members of a labor union which had organized
all the non-supervisory employees of all the milk processing plants in the
Kansas City area. They then attempted to bring all the rural milk
haulers' into the. union and had induced forty-two out of the fifty-five in
6. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U. S. 369 (1944) (interstate transportation of
prostitutes on a purely vacation trip does not come under Mann Act) ; see Note (1945)
39 ILL. L. Rav. 293.

7. It has been pointed out that the law opens wide the door for blackmailers and
imposes restrictions on the individual which the states have never enforced. Rogers,
The Mann Act and Noncommercial Vice (1933) 37 LAW NotEs 107; Davids, Application of Mann Act to Noncommercial Vice (1916) 20 LAW NoTas 144. The Department of Justice has adopted a policy of studied neglect in applying the Act to the private trips of paramours--a discretionary attitude which is dangerous in itself as tending towards unequal enforcement of the criminal law. Booth, supra note 5 at 1o2, 1O3.
8. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917) (defendant who traveled
across a state line with a woman whom he intended to make his mistress held to be
within the Act).
9.Instant case at i6.
io. E. g., in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 343 (1889) the Court said, "They
(bigamy and.polygamy) tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb
the peace of families, to degrade women, to disease men. Few crimes are more pernicious -" See also Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1,49, 50 (889);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.145, 164 (878).
I. 98 U. S.145 (1878).
12. Under the common law in force in the territory of Utah by virtue of the Organic Act, a child born as the result of a plural marriage is illegitimate, unless legitimated by statute. Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah 258, 134 Pac. 116o (1913).
13. Manion, Religion and American Law (1942) 22 B. U. L. REv. 261.
14. Instant case at I5.

x. The function of the haulers was to transport the milk from the dairy farmers
to the processing plants. In this group there were both contract haulers and hired
truckers.
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the area to join. In pursuance of their plan 2 they refused to unload the
milk delivered by the respondent because he was not a union member.
An injunction was granted 8 against the appellants for having violated a
statute 4 which prohibited conspiracies in restraint of trade. On appeal,
held, cause affirmed and remanded for redrafting of decree.' Rogers v.
Poteet, C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. (9th ed.) 1157, 499 (Mo. Sup. Ct.
1946).
The decision in this case gives rise to some interesting speculation.
It is to be noted that the only act complained of was appellant's refusal
to unload respondent's milk. But there is much authority to the effect
that union members have a privilege to refrain from working with nonunion handled materials.6 In fact, a Kansas statute which attempted to
extinguish this privilege was declared to be unconstitutional.7 It is true
many cases deny the privilege, but a close analysis will disclose that other
elements were present such as malice, threats, coercion, violence, and
retaliation." But the court found that these were not present here., We
. The union decided not to receive or unload milk from the non-union drivers.
But, not to inconvenience the public, they decided to stop only two drivers initially.
The effect was to keep all the haulers guessing as to which two would have their milk
rejected.
3. A decree of the circuit court of Jackson County, dated May 2, 1945, perpetually
enjoined them "and all persons claiming under or acting under the direction or authority of them, or any of them, from hindering, interfering with, preventing or endeavoring to prevent, interfere with or hinder in any respect whatever, the receipt, unloading
and processing of any milk carried in any truck operated or caused to be operated by
the plaintiff, the said Steve Rogers, his agents, employees or representative, to the said
Borden Dairy Company, in Kansas City, Missouri."
4. 2 Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) c. 43, § 8301, "Any person who shall create, enter
into, become a member of or participate in any pool, trust, agreement, combination,
confederation or understanding with any person or persons in restraint of trade or
competition in the importation, transportation, manufacture, purchase or sale of.any
product or commodity in the state, or thing bought or sold whatever, shall be deemed
and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and shall be punished as
provided for in this article." Note that the Missouri law remains the same as the Federal Sherman Anti-Trust Act was before the passage of the Clayton Act, the NorrisLaGuardia Act, and the National Labor Relations Act.
5. The cause was remanded with directions to redraft the decree to allow the ap-

pellants the right by peaceful picketing and persuasion and means not involving violence, intimidation and coercion to advocate the cause of their union and thereby
advance their own interests.
6. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459 (1917)

(union had a by-law to pre-

vent members from working on non-union materials) ; Stapleton v. Mitchell, 6o F.

Supp, 51 (D. C. Kan., 1945); Natl. Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Assoc., 169
Fed. 259 (C. C. A. 2d, igog) (depends on whether the purpose is to benefit union or to
injure the third person) ; Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917) (up-

held as long as there is no malice, fraud, violence, coercion, intimidation, or defamation) ; Dominic Maurer, Inc. v. Berks Products Corp., 37 Berks 83, 52 D. & C. 470
(Pa., 1945) ; see Alabama Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. i, 20, i8 So.

(2d) 8io, 825 (1944).
7. Stapleton v. Mitchell, 6o F. Supp. 51, 61 (D. C. Kan., 1945). Held unconstitutional, Kan. Sess. Laws 1943, C. 191, § 12, which prohibited any person "to refuse to

handle, install, use or work on particular materials or equipment and supplies because
not produced, processed, or delivered by members of a labor organization."
S. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assoc., 274 U. S. 37
(1927) (Held to be restraint of trade. But Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting, held
that the restraint was not unreasonable and that if the union did not have the privilege to refrain from handling the stone, it would be involuntary servitude.) ; Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) (Sympathetic strike in-aid of a
"secondary boycott." But Brandeis, J., dissenting, said, "But other courts with better
appreciation of the facts of industry recognized the unity of interest through the union
and that, in refusing to work on the materials which threatened it, the union was only
refusing to aid in destroying itself." Holmes and Clark, JJ., concurred with the dissent.) ; A. T. Steam Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 157 N. E. 82 (1927) ;
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997 (I9o8)

(defendant
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might inquire then as to what duty appellants violated- as to respondent,
or, correlatively, what right respondent had that was invaded by appellants. No doubt there was an -interference with respondent's right to a
free market. But this is not -an absolute right at law. No one has the
right to be hedged in and protected from the inroads of ordinary business
conditions and competition, unless the interference is wanton and malicious. 10 One view is that interference with one's trade relations is presumptively unlawful but that the circumstances may furnish justification
for the interference. 1 For justification we must look to appellants' purpose, for in determining the legality of measures taken in these situations
the courts inquire as to whether the purpose was primarily to benefit the
Here the court found no malice towards
union or to injure the plaintiff.'
the respondent. This is apparent from the exemplary conduct of the
appellants. The manner in which respondent was selected as the object3
of their action indicates that there was no personal feeling against him.'
Their refusal to unload the truck was probably the very least they could
do to protect their interests.' 4 But, although they were protecting their
lawful interests by lawful means, the court concluded that their actions
were conspirative-if respondent's milk halding business thereby would
have been destroyed.'5 While the weight of authority holds that such
damages are damnum absque injuria,16 this court says it is enough if the
union threatened plaintiff and his customers with strikes and in some instances actually
caused them) ; Purvis v. Local No. 500, 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl. 585 (i9o6) (Customers of
plaintiff were notified. This notice on the part of 7ooo union employees was held to
be threatening and coercive rather than persuasive).
9.The court found that there was not a complete absence of threats in that appellants personally notified the haulers that they were going to refuse to unload nonunion haulers. But a threat to do something that a person has the privilege to do is
not a threat in a legal sense. Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local No. 4o5, 226 Iowa x91,
284 N. W. 126 (1939).
Io.Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620 (1888); United Union
Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939) (a person's business is a
property right and is entitled to protection from unlawful interference) ; see Booth &
Bro. v. Burgess, 82 N. J.Eq. i81, 65 Atl. 226 (igo6).
ii. Cohen & Roth v. Bricklayer's Union, 92 Conn. i61, ioI Atl. 659 (i917)
(Union had a by-law not to work on non-union materials. Plaintiff was damaged.
The union intended to damage him. Held, incidental damage to plaintiff was justified
by union's purpose to benefit itself). "It is not easy to define the point beyond which
labor in combination can't go. . . . A person in furtherance of his own interests
may take such action as the circumstances may require . . . he cannot be charged
with actionable wrong, whatever may be the result of his conduct in pursuing his own
welfare." Grant Const. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 172, 175,
i61 N. W. 520, 522, 523 (1917). ". . . The exercise by one man of his legal right
cannot be a legal wrong to another. . . . Whatever one has a legal right to do another can have no right to complain of."

§532.

3 CooL.E,

LAv OF

ToRTs (4th ed.,

1932)

(Union
12. Parkinson v. Bldg. Trades Council, 154 Cal. 58I, 98 P. 1027 (19o8)
previously adopted a by-law. Purpose was for benefit of the union. The court also
stated that economic and political aspects enter into these situations.) ; Lohse Patent
Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997 (1908) (here the court held the primary purpose was to injure plaintiff and that the benefit to the union was merely incidental) ; see also note ii, supra.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. It was the contention of appellants that there was a disparity between the
wages of the rural and union employees which caused bad conditions in the plants and
had a tendency to cut down the wages and working conditions that the union had won
for its members. Instant case at 58,321.
15. Instant case at 58,324.
i6. "The damage to such persons may be serious-it may even extend to their
ruin-but if it is inflicted by a combination in the legitimate pursuit of its own affairs,
it is damnum absque injuria." Natl. Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Assoc., 169
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object of the confederation is to restrain or destroy existing trade-even
though the primary purpose was to benefit the union.17 At any rate, the
result is a decree that reflects the court's none too sympathetic attitude
towards labor. This is obvious in its comment on the public policy as
stated in the Norris-LaGuardia 18 and National Labor Relations Acts. 9
There the public policy was based on the inequality of bargaining power
of labor as against corporate and other forms of ownership association.
The court makes the statement that, "Now the conditions are reversed.
Labor organizations have acquired overpowering strength." 20 That the
court should so express itself may well be deemed to be arbitrary. The
result is a decision which appears to be a step back from the views expressed by liberal courts under our present labor legislation.

Selective Service-Military Jurisdiction-Effect of Refusal to
Take Oath on Validity of Induction Into the Army-Petitioner, who
had claimed exemption from the draft as a minister of religion, was
ordered to report for induction into the army. When he was requested,
along with other selectees, to take the oath of allegiance as a part of the
induction ceremony, he intentionally failed to do so. However, this silent
refusal went unnoticed by the officer in charge. Petitioner, both before
and after the induction process, told army personnel at the induction
center that he would not and had not taken the oath. He failed to report
to an army headquarters as ordered, was arrested for being absent without
leave, and taken to an army camp. Petitioner then brought habeas corpus
to adjudge the validity of this restraint. Held, under the evidence, petitioner did not submit to induction and therefore was not subject to military
jurisdiction.' Lawrence v. Yost, 157 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1946).
Here is a post-war analysis of a problem which frequently confronted
the federal courts during the war years: when is a draftee actually inducted into the army so as to become subject to military jurisdiction?
The difficulty stemmed from the Selective Training and Service Act of
19402 which did not specify when a selectee became in fact a member of
the armed forces. In 1944, the Supreme Court, in Billings v. Truesdella
decided that induction could not be forced upon a person in order to make
him subject to military jurisdiction where he refuses to take the oath, and
Fed. 259, 265 (C. C.

A. 2d, 1909).

".

.

.

an action does not lie when two or more

persons agree to do a lawful act in a lawful manner and cause damage thereby. . ..
Continental Bank & Trust Co. of N. Y. v. W. A. R. Realty Corp., 265 App. Div. 729,
40'N. Y. S. (2d) 854, 858 (ist Dept. 1943) ; Shannon v. Gaar, 233 Iowa 38, 6 N. W.
(2d) 3o4 (1942).
17. Instant case at 58,324.

18. 47

STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 102 (1940).

19. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § i51 (1940).
20. Instant case at 58,329.
i. The court did not hold that the taking of the oath was a necessary prerequisite
to induction, but that the petitioner's passive refusal to accept the oath along with the
other evidence did sustain his contention that he had not submitted to induction. The
court was particularly influenced by his outspoken frankness before and after the induction procedure.
2. 54

STAT.

894, 5o U. S. C. App. § 311 (940).

"No person shall be tried by any

military or naval court martial in any case arising under this Act unless such person

has been actually inducted for the training and service prescribed under this Act. .....
3. 321 U. S. 542 (1944). Here, when selectee refused to take the oath, he was put
under military guard and restrained against his will, and informed that he was in the
army. Thereupon he refused to obey an order and was held to await court martial.

Habeas corpus was brought immediately to challenge the military authority over him.
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induction is necessary to complete the procedure of selective service.
Court concluded by saying ".

.

The

a selectee becomes 'actually inducted'

within the meaning of Section ii of the Act when in obedience to the
order of his local board and after the Army has found him acceptable for
service he undergoes whatever ceremony or requirements of admission
the War Department has prescribed." 4 At the time of the disputed induction in the instant case, the Army's concept'of the procedure was a
short patriotic talk followed by an explanation of the obligations and privileges of a soldier, and a refusal to take the oath of allegiance did not alter
in any respect the military status of the draftee.5 All of the war time
decisions after the Billings case reveal that the courts had little trouble in
holding that a manifested voluntary refusal to take the oath did not, in
the absence of coercion," render the inductee immune from military law.
However, in all but one of these cases, there was the clinching factor of
voluntary assumption of military rights and duties following the refusal
to take the oath. 7 In addition to the language in the Billings case, the
subsequent decisions seem to make it perfectly clear that the taking of
the oath is not a prerequisite to induction. Furthermore, that in order
to successfully resist induction some affirmative refusal to be inducted at
the time of the process must be made which is not then followed by an
assumption of military activities. 8 The facts of the instant case distinguish
it from the precedents in two respects: (i) Yost, instead of openly asserting his objections to induction, was silent and passive at the time of
administration of the oath, a factor indicating that he was inducted; '
(2) Yost's subsequent conduct was not such as to constitute a waiver of
avy irregularities in the induction ceremony, a factor indicating that he
had not submitted to induction. 10 It is not easy, therefore; to discern
4. Id. at 559.
5. ARmy REG. Sept. i, i942, No. 615-500, f 13.
6. See It re Herman, 56 F. Supp. 733 (N. D. Tex. i944), held not inducted where
selectee refused to take oath notwithstanding which he was forced to don a uniform,
but he refused to accept military pay and half-heartedly participated in soldier activities.
7. Sanford v. Callan, 148 F. (2d) 376 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) (passive refusal to take
oath following which inductee wore uniform; went to army camp, drilled, and drew
pay) ; Hibbs v. Catovolo, 145 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944) (manifested refusal to
take oath followed by a voluntary performance of all military duties for ten months) ;
Mayborn v. Heflebower, 145 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944) (manifested refusal to
take oath followed by a willful performance of all duties required of a soldier including the acceptance of benefits of government insurance and an operation in an army
hospital) ; United States v. Mellis, 59 F. Supp. 682 (M. D. N. C., 1945) (manifested
refusal to take oath after which selectee applied for insurance and benefits for dependent mother, and did everything like any other soldier for over a month) ; Miller
v. Commanding Officer, 57 F. Supp. 884 (N. D. Tex., i944) (after a manifested refusal to take oath, selectee served approximately three years in the army, during which,
at his request, was given non-combative duty; drew salary, took furloughs, promoted
to sergeant).
8. It is important to note in the Billings case, supra note 3, that the draftee not
only refused to take the oath but also refused to do anything else that was required of
him, showing beyond a doubt that he had not submitted to induction.
9. The principal case was a 5-2 decision, and the dissenters strenuously argued
that the-petitioner was required to speak up and refuse to be inducted'during the induction process-or he was inducted.
io. In none of the preceding cases, supra note 7, did the courts say or indicate for
how long a person had to voluntarily assume military rights and duties so that he
could be held to have waived his refusal to accept the oath. In those cases this period
varied from five weeks to almost three years. But cf. Ex parte Kruk, 62 F. Supp. 9O1
(N. D. Calif., 1945), held selectee was inducted where he openly declined to take the
oath, immediately deserted, and was not apprehended until two years later.
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enough factual justification in the evidence to sustain the court's contention of non-induction, but rather, this case appears glaringly contra to
those which preceded it. The court's conclusion can perhaps be explained,
and possibly justified, as a tendency towards leniency, which prefers not to
allow the social stigma of a court martial to attach because of one's religious
belief now that the war is over.

Torts-Liability without Fault-Limitations on the Rule of
Rylands v. Filetcher-Plaintiff, against her wishes, was employed by
the Ministry of Supply in defendant's munitions plant and was injured
therein when a shell exploded. In an action for damages in which no
negligence was averred or proved, Held, for defendant.1 The rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher2 is inapplicable without an escape of the damagecausing thing from defendant's land to a place outside his occupation or
control. Read v. I. Lyons & Co., Ltd., 62 T. L. R. 646 (H. L., 1946).
This decision is of singular interest not only for the express limitation placed on the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, but also for the strong
dictum that the doctrine does not apply to cases of personal injuries 3 and
for the further intimation that it is not an unnatural use of land to
manufacture explosives thereon in time of war.4 At first glance, the
holding of the instant case might seem an arbitrary one if the concept of
liability without fault is to be recognized at all. 5 But to permit recovery
under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher would seem to ignore the fundamental basis of that rule as well as the general policy of past English
judicial decision. The general 'trend of modem tort law has been one of
gradual progress away from the concept that one acts at his own peril
toward one of imposing liability only where fault exists. 6 The rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher is only one well recognized example of certain excepI. The trial court held that Rylands v. Fletcher was applicable, and gave judgment
for the plaintiff. Read v. J. Lyons & Co., Ltd., [1944] 2 All Eng. R. 98, 6o T. L. R.

363. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal, [1945] I All Eng. R. io6,
61 T. L. R. 148, 33 CALr. L. REv. 642.
2. Mr. Justice Blackburn in Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. I Ex. 265, 279 (1866),
aff'd. L. R. 3 H. L. 300 (1868) : "We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not
do so, is prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape." Lord Cairns, on appeal, added the further requirement that the use to
which the defendant is putting his land must be a "non-natural" use. L. R. 3 H. L.
300, 338-339 (1868).
3. Instant case at 648. But see Miles v. Forest Rock Granite Co., Ltd., 34 T. L.
R. 500, 50, (C. A. 1918) ; Wing v. London General Omnibus Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 652,
665 (C. A.), 25 T. L. R. 729, 732.
4. Instant case at 649. But cf. Rainham Chemical Works, Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish
Guano Co., Ltd., [1921] 2 A. C. 465, 471, 37 T. L. R. 973. Cf. Rickards v. Lothian,
[1913] A. C. 263, 280 (P. C.), 29 T. L. R. 281, 285. See also Bohlen, The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher (igi1) 59 U. OF PA. L. REv. 298, 302-303.
5. Plaintiff's counsel contended that, because of the admittedly dangerous nature
of defendant's business, it was illogical and unjust to permit a plaintiff to recover if
injured just outside defendant's premises, and yet deny recovery if the ixdjury occurred
just within those premises. See [1944] 2 All Eng. R. 98, 1O5, 6o T. L. R. 363, 366.,
6. 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1937) 447, 458-459;
Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification (1917) 30
HARV. L. REv. 241, 328, 330; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts; Its History
(1894) 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 383, 441.
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tions to this trend. 7 It finds its foundation in the duty which an occupier
of land owes to an occupier of other land in respect to an intrusion from
the land of the one to the land of the other." It is not a general rule of
absolute liability upon which all other exceptions are based." Since it is a
distinct and independent exception to the general trend, it should be
confined to its own bounds when relied on for recovery, and its requirements strictly construed. 10 While courts have permitted certain
extensions of the rule,"' in general the trend has been to limit it. ,2 Hence,
in the instant case, since there was no "escape," the rule is inapplicable.' 3
Furthermore, it may be that the House of Lords was influenced by the
possible consequences of a contrary holding, namely, the establishment
of all firms engaged in hazardous trades as automatic insurers of the safety
of their employees, a proposition unknown to the common law.' 4 This
decision may have little immediate effect upon American courts in view
of the confusion surrounding Rylands v. Fletcher in this country,

5

and

7. For other exceptions see, e. g., Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. io C. P. 1O, 12
(1874) (trespass by cattle); Besozzi v. Harris, i F. & F. 92 (N. P. 1858) (fierce
animals) ; May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. loi (1846) (same) ; Carpenter, The Doctrine of
Green v. General Petroleum Corporation (1932) 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265-266.
8. Instant case at 653. Cf. PoLLoCK, ToRTs (i4th ed. I939) 387, 391-392; Thayer,
Liability without Fault (1916) 29 HAuv. L. REv. 8oi, 804-805. But cf. CHEARLESWORTH,
NEGLIGENCE (1938) 219.
9- Cattle straying is an instance of strict common law trespass. Ellis v. Loftus
Iron Co., L. R. 1o C. P. 1O, 12 (1874). Absolute liability for harm ififlicted by
fierce animals, whether on or off defendant's land, is based on "presumed negligence", 'and the fact that "an animal is capable of spontaneous action." Aldham v.
United Dairies, Ltd., [1940] 1 K B. 507, 511, 56 T. L. L 201, 202. But see Sycamore
v. Ley, 147 L. T. R. 342, 345 (C. A. 1932) ; Manton v. Brocklebank, [1923] 2 K B.
(C. A.); Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., Ltd., 25 Q. B. D. 258, 261
(C. A. i89o); Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land
(1929) 3 CAmaB. L. J. 378, 384-385.
io. [Rylands v. Fletcher] "is not to be extended beyond the legitimate principle
on which the House of Lords decided it. If it were extended as far as strict logic
might require, it would be a very oppressive decision." Green v. Chelsea Waterworks
Co., io T. L. R. 259 (C. A. 1894). Hence there can be no force in the contention that
the liability imposed on the facts of the instant case should be analogous to that imposed
in the fierce animal cases.
i. Northwestern Utilities, Ltd. v. Guarantee Accident Co., Ltd., [1936] A. C.
1O8 (P. C.), 52 T. L. ,R. 93 (where gas escaped from mains under a public road) ;
Charing Cross Electricity Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co., [1914] 3 K. B. 772 (C. A.), 30
T. L. R. 441 (where leakage from defendant's water mains damaged plaintiff's electric
cables); West v. Bristol Tramways Co., [1908] 2 K. B. 14 (C. A.), 24 T. L. R. 478
(where creosote from woodblocks, with which defendant paved a public highway, injured plaintiff's land).
12. "There are so many exceptions to it that it is doubtful whether there is much
of the rule left. . . ." St. Anne's Will Brewery Co. v. Roberts, 44 T. L. R. 703, 705
(C. A. 1928). See also POLLOCK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 39o; Thayer, spra note 8,
at 803.
13. Accord, Howard v. Furness Houlder Argentine Lines, Ltd., 41 Com. Cas. 29o
(K. B. 1936), [1936] 2 All Eng. R. 781 (where plaintiff was injured by the escape of
steam from the boilers of a ship on which he was working). See H. & C. Grayson,
Ltd. v. Ellerman Line, Ltd., 36 T. L. R. 295 (H. L. 192o) ; Powell v. Fall, 5 Q. B. D.
59 (C. A. 188o) ; Ponting v. Noakes, [1894] 2 Q. B. 281, IO T. L. R. 444; cases cited
su.pra note ii. Contra: CHARLESWORTH, op. cit. supra note 8, at 219.
14. Note (1945) 95 L. J. 176. See Bohlen, supra note 4, at 303.
15. Rylands v. Fletcher is rejected by name in the majority of American jurisdictions. Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442 (1873) ; Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. L. 339
(1876) ; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 (1873). Contra: Wilson v. New Bedford,
io8 Mass. 261 (1871) ; Cohill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872) ; Bradford Glycerine
Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Mfg. Co., 6o Ohio St. 56o, 54 N. E. 528 (I899). But the
very courts which have so rejected it have repeatedly imposed strict liability for "nuisances" with the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher as the true basis of liability. PRossER,
ToRTs (1941) 451-452; cf. Exner v. Sherman Power Const Co., 54 F. (2d) 510 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1931).
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the prevalence of workman's compensation legislation; but it appears
clearly in conflict with the Restatement of Torts.16' For better or for
worse, then, the effect of this decision in England will be to limit the rule
of Rylands v. Fletcherto much the same factual situations as that to which
it was originally applied by Mr. Justice Blackburn; and it would seem that
in the absence of such comparable facts or proof of specific negligence,
a plaintiff's only hope
for recovery would lie in a successful invocation of
7
res ipsa loquitur.1
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 519: ". . • One who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should
recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for
harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although
the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." See Friedman, Liability for Dangerous Activities Carried Out by Publie Order (1945) 8 MoD. L. REV. 248, 249-250;
Note (1945) 95 L. J. 176. It is likely, however, that the same results would have been
reached had § 519 been applicable, in view of the exceptions thereto in §§ 521 (a public
duty imposed on the actor) and 523 (person harmed knew risk and took part in it).
17. Instant case at 65I; Thayer, supra note 8, at 8o6-807.

